e address the value of quick response production practices when selling to a forward-looking consumer population with uncertain, heterogeneous valuations for a product. Consumers have the option of purchasing the product early, before its value has been learned, or delaying the purchase decision until a time at which valuation uncertainty has been resolved. Whereas individual consumer valuations are uncertain ex ante, the market size is uncertain to the firm. The firm may either commit to a single production run at a low unit cost prior to learning demand, or commit to a quick response strategy that allows additional production after learning additional demand information. We find that the value of quick response is generally lower with strategic (forward-looking) customers than with nonstrategic (myopic) customers in this setting. Indeed, it is possible for a quick response strategy to decrease the profit of the firm, though whether this occurs depends on various characteristics of the market; specifically, we identify conditions under which quick response increases profit (when prices are increasing, when dissatisfied consumers can return the product at a cost to the firm) and conditions under which quick response may decrease profit (when prices are constant or when consumer returns are not allowed).
Introduction
Long production and shipping lead times are cited as key causes of supply and demand mismatches, particularly on products manufactured in an offshore fashion (e.g., produced in Asia and exported to the United States or Europe). Because of these long lead times, demand forecasts and production decisions must be made far in advance of the selling season, when uncertainty concerning final demand is high. Thus, if lead times could be reduced-via, for example, localized production, improved information systems and forecast updating, multichannel production and emergency supply sources, and expedited shipping methods-allowing for a rapid response to updated demand information closer to (or during) the selling season, supply and demand could be more closely matched, reducing or eliminating costly shortages and wasteful overproduction. Such techniques to mitigate demand uncertainty (which we refer to hereafter as quick response systems) can be costly because of information technology (IT) expenses and expedited production or transportation costs, but are known to provide significant value to firms by better matching supply with uncertain demand (Fisher and Raman 1996, Eppen and Iyer 1997) .
Most existing work on this subject analyzes quick response practices using a fixed demand model; that is, market demand (i.e., consumers) does not react when a firm adopts quick response capabilities. However, the consequences of a quick response system-particularly lower demand variability and potentially greater costs-have a tangible impact on consumers by influencing measures that they directly experience, most notably the fill rate (fraction of demand that is satisfied). Consumers, in turn, may take changes in these measures into account when making their own purchasing decisions, and as a result market demand may change along a variety of dimensions such as the timing of purchases by consumers. For example, Richtel (2007) describes how consumers learned about the general scarcity of the Nintendo Wii (low fill rates) and modified their own behavior (buying any available units) in response; O'Donnell (2006) describes how consumers learn about and react to inventory availability and markdown frequency in the fashion industry; and Rosenbloom (2009) describes how luxury goods retailers have influenced consumer behavior by reducing inventory.
Thus, an important issue is how individual consumers may respond to the adoption of quick response techniques, and indeed whether firms can continue to exploit the benefits of quick response production once the market reacts optimally to this practice. Previous work Swinney 2009, 2011) has shown that consumers may react to quick response capabilities in a way that benefits the firm. Specifically, if consumers are "strategic" in the sense that they anticipate potential future price reductions by a firm and time their purchases accordingly, adopting quick response can reduce the probability of clearance sales (by increasing the accuracy of demand forecasts) and hence induce consumers to pay full price for a product. In this paper, we examine a scenario in which the market may react to the adoption of quick response practices in a negative way; that is, by employing quick response, a firm influences inventory availability such that consumers will optimally react in a manner that reduces total firm demand and profit. This setting is characterized by a key feature: consumer value for the product is initially uncertain and is learned over time.
Valuation uncertainty may arise in consumer goods in a number of different ways. Parents increasingly participate in the unfortunate ritual of trying to identify the "hot" holiday toy for their children (Slatalla 2002) , trading off the risk of buying early and facing uncertain value for the product (i.e., possibly buying a toy that turns out to be a "dud" or that their child does not want) with the risk of buying late and facing uncertain availability for the product (i.e., experiencing a stockout). Consumer value may also be uncertain if the product is a new or innovative item (e.g., a complex product such as a Nintendo Wii, an Apple iPhone, or an automobile); a media item (such as books, movies, music, or video games); or if the consumer's requirements for the item are uncertain (e.g., snow skis for a potential weekend trip in two months when weather is unknown).
A common feature of all of these examples is that over time, consumers learn more information about the product and gain a better sense of its value; for example, via channels such as professional product reviews from websites and magazines; the reviews of fellow consumers (e.g., from online retailers such as Amazon.com); the experiences of friends and family who may have purchased the same product; or via the resolution of intrinsic uncertainty in product value (e.g., the weather affecting the value of a pair of skis is known the day of the ski trip). Hence, consumers may recognize that future learning will occur and may choose to delay a purchase until they have more information about a product's value.
In the spirit of these examples, our model consists of consumers that initially have uncertain value for a product, but who know that information about product value will be learned at some point in the future.
Individual consumers in our model thus make a decision on when and whether to purchase the product: The later the customer waits to buy, the more information she will have about product value and the greater the risk of a stockout. Specifically, in our model consumers choose to either purchase early-prior to learning their value for a product-or purchase late, after learning their value. Hence, consumers in our model may strategically delay a purchase to learn more about product value rather than obtain a product of known value at a lower price, as in Swinney (2009, 2011) . Although the mechanisms driving strategic consumer purchasing behavior are similar in the two settings-delaying a purchase to potentially increase net surplus-the consequences for the firm, particularly in how the firm values quick response practices, are very different.
We show that when consumers experience this type of time dependent learning, greater availability resulting from an improved matching of supply and demand encourages consumers to delay purchasing the product: By reducing the likelihood of a stockout, the firm decreases the risk of waiting to learn more information about product value. As more consumers strategically delay purchasing, total demand can decrease (via mitigation of an effect known as advance selling; Xie and Shugan 2001) and profit can be reduced despite the fact that the firm can better match supply and demand via quick response. Thus, in contrast to previous work showing that the interplay of quick response and consumer behavior can lead to greater value for firms in some settings, our model demonstrates that when consumers learn about product value over time quick response capabilities can actually influence consumer behavior in a way that is detrimental to firm profits. We further show that whether this occurs (and to what degree it occurs) depends heavily on several characteristics of the selling environment; specifically, the price path (increasing or decreasing over time) and the consumer return policy (whether refunds are offered to dissatisfied consumers) play a major role in determining the value of matching supply and demand via quick response.
Literature Review
Quick response production as a vehicle to help mitigate and respond to demand uncertainty has received a significant amount of attention in the literature (see, e.g., Fisher and Raman 1996, Eppen and Iyer 1997) . Typically, these papers model quick response as leading to a reduction in lead times and hence a decrease in demand uncertainty. Mechanisms involved in this reduction of demand uncertainty may include external revelation of information (exogenous fashion trends, etc.), marketing or information collection efforts by the firm (e.g., focus group testing), or even early sales data based on sample production in selected markets. Specifically, we adopt a stylized, two-stage approach in which the firm is allowed an initial order (long before the selling season and subject to high demand uncertainty) and a second order (at a higher marginal cost close to the selling season with demand uncertainty virtually eliminated), similar to Swinney (2009), Caro and Martínez-de-Albéniz (2010) , and Krishnan et al. (2010) . In addition, much like our model, a number of these papers analyze the impact of quick response on nonoperational aspects of the firm such as competition Ha 2008, Caro and Martínez-de-Albéniz 2010) and retailer sales effort (Krishnan et al. 2010) . The primary distinction between our model and previous work in the quick response literature is that we explicitly model the consumer purchasing decision subject to consumer valuation uncertainty.
A number of recent papers have incorporated models of intertemporal consumer purchasing decisions into traditional operational models. Examples include Su and Zhang (2008) , Liu and van Ryzin (2008) , and Aviv and Pazgal (2008) , all of which consider consumers that strategically time purchases because prices change over time. In contrast, we consider consumers that time purchases because information about product value will be revealed over time. Several papers consider a similar scenario. DeGraba (1995) demonstrates that in the absence of demand uncertainty, a firm may intentionally understock to induce consumers to purchase when valuations are uncertain and learned over time. Xie and Shugan (2001) demonstrate that selling to consumers prior to the determination of value and consumption (e.g., with advance ticket sales) can substantially increase firm profits. Alexandrov and Lariviere (2007) consider the problem of a restaurant choosing whether to offer reservations (guaranteed seats) to customers who may or may not value dining on a given night, demonstrating when reservations increase the profit of the firm. Akan et al. (2008) discuss optimal pricing to screen heterogeneous consumers whose values are revealed over time. In these papers, in contrast to our model, inventory (or capacity) is either infinite, exogenously set, or fixed throughout the selling season, and hence issues of inventory replenishment after receiving updated demand information are not considered. An exception is Prasad et al. (2011) , who analyze a newsvendor selling to consumers who may or may not know their valuations and show that the optimality of advance selling (selling to consumers before they know their valuations) depends on operational measures such as the degree of demand uncertainty.
Finally, a few recent papers bridge both streams of research by considering the impact of consumer purchasing behavior on the value of quick response. In Swinney (2009) and Swinney (2011) , consumers may delay purchasing in order to obtain the product at a lower price during an endof-season clearance sale. Li and Zhang (2010) analyze the related problem of accepting preorders to generate early demand information (and hence improve forecast accuracy to better match supply and demand). In all three papers, consumers have known value for the product in question and potentially delay a purchase to pay a lower price; by contrast, our model focuses on valuation uncertainty as the driving mechanism of strategic consumer behavior. To summarize, our model is the first, to our knowledge, that considers the interaction of strategic consumer purchasing behavior with the value of quick response production practices when consumers learn about product value over time.
Model

The Firm and Consumers
A firm sells a single product at an exogenous price p to a consumer population of size N over a single selling season. There are two potential production opportunities for the firm: early production (far in advance of the selling season) and late production (very close to the start of the season). Early production is far enough in advance of the season that market size is unknown, though the firm does possess some forecast of demand; thus, during the early production opportunity, N is assumed to be a random variable with positive support, distribution function F 4 · 5, and density f 4 · 5. The late production opportunity is close enough to the start of the selling season that market size is known perfectly.
1 Production during the early opportunity incurs a unit cost c 1 , whereas production during the late opportunity incurs a higher unit cost c 2 c 1 because of, e.g., expedited production and shipping costs. Production at either point in time is assumed to be uncapacitated, and production during the late opportunity is assumed to have a short enough lead time that all units arrive before the start of the selling season.
The firm thus operates in one of two potential regimes: the single procurement (SP) regime or the quick 1 In reality, forecast updating and refinement may be the result of an endogenous process that may continue even during the selling season, e.g., monitoring early sales and imputing total demand, or performing market research. To avoid issues outside the scope of this analysis-e.g., demand estimation based on stochastic arrivalswe assume that the revelation of N is exogenous and perfect and occurs just prior to the start of the season. response (QR) regime. In the SP regime, all production occurs during the early production opportunity, whereas in the QR regime, production may occur at both times. Excess inventory remaining at the end of the selling season has zero value. In both operating regimes, we denote the early production quantity by q (the late production quantity in the QR regime is assumed to be the profit-maximizing quantity), and the firm chooses production levels to maximize total expected profit. Although the firm faces market size uncertainty, consumers initially face uncertainty about their own private valuations for the product. Nature moves first (prior to the start of the game) and decides the "type" of each consumer: A fraction à of the population has positive value v > p for the item, and a fraction 1 É à has zero value, where à and v are common knowledge. If a consumer possesses value v for the product, we refer to her as a "high type" consumer, whereas if she possesses zero value for the product, we refer to her as a "low type" consumer.
At the start of the selling season, consumers do not know their private valuation for the product (their type). At a random time during the selling season (i.e., uniformly distributed throughout the season), each consumer exogenously learns her value for the product (via, for instance, product reviews from professionals and other consumers, experiences with demonstration units in the store, etc.). Although consumers do not know their individual valuations at the start of the selling season, they are not completely ignorant: Each consumer receives a noisy private signal that is an indication of her type. We define Å to be the quality of the signal, i.e., the probability that the signal is correct. For example, a high type consumer receives a signal of high product value with probability Å, and a low type consumer receives a signal of low product value with the same probability. Thus, there are four possible consumer segments (corresponding to pairings of the two possible signals and the two possible values) summarized in Table 1 .
Consumers are heterogeneous in the quality of their private signals in the sense that Å is distributed among the population (independently of consumer type) according to the continuous distribution G4 · 5 and density g4 · 5 with support on the interval 41/21 15. Such heterogeneity in the quality of the signal may represent, for example, domain expertise of the population in the product category (e.g., some consumers Åg4Å5 dÅ are highly technical and capable of accurately judging the quality of a new, high-tech product, whereas some less sophisticated consumers receive more noisy signals that leave them less sure of product value). Thus, the total number of consumers in each segment depicted in Table 1 is found by integrating the probabilities in that table over the distribution of signal strengths. The resulting distribution of consumer segments arising from this information structure is summarized in Table 2 . After receiving their private signals, consumers arrive at the firm at the start of the selling season. Each consumer updates her beliefs of product value via Bayes' rule and calculates the expected utility of purchasing early (before knowing product value) and the expected utility of delaying her purchase until she learns the value of the product, based on her private signal and individual signal strength. To evaluate the expected surplus of delaying a purchase, a consumer must also consider the probability that she will be able to obtain a unit at some later point in the selling season, i.e., the consumer must form a belief about the fill rate, denotedî. (Further details of this belief will be discussed in the next section.)
After consumers learn their value, they purchase if and only if they have positive surplus and the product is in stock, and any consumer who does not obtain a unit receives zero surplus. Consumers are risk-neutral expected utility maximizers who choose the purchasing strategy (before or after learning product value) that maximizes their total expected surplus (expected product value minus purchase price). We assume that customers who are indifferent between the two strategies purchase before learning product value. To summarize, each consumer knows 1. her private signal of product value (high or low) and her individual signal strength Å;
2. the common valuation distribution and its parameters (i.e., that a fraction à of the population has value v); 3. the purchase price p; and 4. her belief about the future availability of the product,î.
To simultaneously model both strategic (forwardlooking) and nonstrategic (myopic) customers, we introduce a parameter Ñ 2 801 19 that is analogous to a discount factor: if Ñ = 0, customers do not anticipate the opportunity to purchase after learning product value, whereas if Ñ = 1, they do.
The Consumer Decision: Wait or Buy?
We now analyze the consumer decision: whether to wait or buy. In analyzing the consumer decision, the relevant unit of analysis is a consumer who arrives at the start of the selling season, finds a unit in stock, 2 and considers purchasing the product immediately (which ensures that a unit will be obtained, but not that value will be high) or delaying the purchase decision until she learns her valuation (which ensures that the consumer will only purchase if she has high value for the product but does not ensure that she will successfully obtain a unit).
3 The expected surplus of an immediate purchase is É s 4Å5v É p, where É s 4Å5 is the posterior probability that the consumer has high value for the product, conditional on a signal s 2 8l1 h9 (i.e., low or high value) and signal strength Å. For a consumer receiving a high value signal, this posterior probability is
Pr4high type and high signal5 Pr4high signal5
Note that É h 4Å5 is increasing in Å. Similarly, if the consumer receives a signal indicating that the product is low value, the posterior probability is
consumers receiving a low signal may receive positive surplus from an early purchase, whereas if É l 4Å5v É p < 0, all low signal consumers receive negative 2 If any consumer finds the firm out of stock, the game is essentially over; because of our assumption that the firm's QR order arrives prior to the start of the selling season, if a consumer finds the firm out of stock, all subsequent consumers will as well, regardless of the operating regime. 3 Technically, the consumer chooses between purchasing before learning her value and after learning her value, both of which could potentially be at any time during the selling season. However, conditional that a consumer decides to purchase before learning her value, the optimal time to purchase is immediately at the start of the season (as this minimizes the risk of a stockout). Similarly, conditional on purchasing after learning product value, the optimal purchase time is at the moment she realizes her value for the product, as this too minimizes the risk of a stockout. Hence, the consumer effectively chooses between an immediate purchase at the start of the season and a purchase at the moment she learns her valuation. Note that subgame perfection of the consumer strategy is not an issue, as consumers do not observe inventory directly and hence cannot update beliefs about demand, supply, or fill rates as the season progresses.
surplus. In the following analysis, we assume that the latter case holds for all Å.
4 Because of this assumption, all consumers receiving a low signal have negative expected surplus from purchasing before learning their valuation. It follows that all such consumers will delay purchasing until after learning their valuations, and only those consumers who receive a high signal will consider a purchase prior to learning their valuations. The expected surplus for a high signal consumer from an early purchase is É h 4Å5v É p, whereas the expected surplus from a delayed purchase is ÑîÉ h 4Å54v É p5. Note that if É h 4Å5 = 1 early surplus is greater than late surplus (because Ñ1î  1), whereas if É h 4Å5 = 0 late surplus is strictly greater than early surplus. It intuitively follows that consumers purchase early if É h 4Å5 is high, a fact that leads to our first preliminary result characterizing consumer actions in any possible equilibrium in which consumers have identical beliefs about the fill rate: Lemma 1. In any equilibrium with identical consumer beliefsî, there exists a unique critical Å ⇤ such that all consumers who receive a high value signal and have Å Å ⇤ purchase before learning product value, whereas all consumers with Å < Å ⇤ wait until after learning product value.
Proof. All proofs appear in the appendix. É Lemma 1 shows that in any equilibrium (the precise form of which we have not yet specified beyond requiring identical beliefsî), consumers who receive a signal of high product value and who have high signal quality (accurately judge product value) will purchase before learning their valuations, whereas consumers who have low signal quality (poorly judge product value) will delay until after learning product value. Thus, we may characterize the equilibrium behavior of the consumer population by a single parameter, the critical signal strength Å ⇤ . In equilibrium, the critical signal strength is determined by calculating the surplus from an immediate purchase by a consumer who arrives at the store and finds a unit in stock and equating that surplus with the expected surplus of delaying the purchase until learning product value, solving for Å and yielding
The Inventory-Purchase Timing Game
Consumers and the firm thus take part in a game: Consumers choose when to purchase (either before or after learning product value), and the firm chooses how much inventory to produce (either in the single early production opportunity in the SP regime, or in both production opportunities in the QR regime). We first analyze the SP and QR regimes separately, then consider firm profit in each scenario to determine firm preference between the two operational capabilities. The sequence of events in the quick response regime is summarized in Figure 1 . The sequence in the SP regime is identical, except there is no second production opportunity. We assume that the firm cannot credibly commit to an inventory level; that is, consumers do not directly observe the inventory level of the firm prior to making their purchasing decisions. This is a typical assumption (Su and Zhang 2008, Cachon and Swinney 2009 ) reflective of the fact that precise inventory information is often obscured from common consumers and, moreover, it is difficult for the firm to credibly convey information about inventory (e.g., the firm always has incentive to tell consumers there is less inventory than actually is available in order to engender a sense of scarcity). Similarly, we assume that the consumer population cannot credibly commit to a critical signal strength that determines equilibrium purchase timing, hence the firm must form beliefs about the critical signal strength (which we labelÅ) and make optimal inventory decisions given these beliefs. Such beliefs may derive from past experience with similar products, from marketing research or from a detailed understanding of the consumer valuation structure. From a modeling perspective, this means the game is one of simultaneous moves between the consumer population and the firm. In other words, consumers optimally time their purchases given a fixed belief about inventory availability (î), whereas the firm optimizes inventory given a 
Selling season
The initial production opportunity (prior to learning market size, N ).
Consumers who waited uniformly learn their private valuation for the product, and purchase if their surplus is positive.
Consumers arrive, observe private signals of product value, and choose to purchase immediately or wait to learn product value.
The second production opportunity (after learning market size, N ).
fixed belief about consumer purchase timing (Å), and the simultaneous solution to these optimization problems forms the Nash equilibrium to the game.
As a final step, we assume that both firm and consumer expectations are rational, i.e., consistent with the equilibrium outcomes (Su and Zhang 2008 , Cachon and Swinney 2009 , Huang and Van Mieghem 2009 . Rational expectations are a result of both consumers and the firm possessing beliefs that do not systematically deviate from reality; more discussion of this assumption follows below. The equilibrium will thus be characterized by values of q (the firm's inventory level) and Å (the critical signal strength of the consumer population). Let the superscript * denote a generic equilibrium parameter (replacing * with sp or qr when referring specifically to the single procurement or quick response case). We then formally define the equilibrium as follows:
⇤ ) with rational expectations to the game between the firm and the consumer population satisfies the following:
1. The firm chooses an initial inventory level q ⇤ (and, in the QR regime, a second inventory procurement) to maximize total expected profit, conditional on beliefs about consumer behaviorÅ. 2. The consumer population determines the critical signal strength Å ⇤ , conditional on beliefs about product availabilityî.
3. Firm beliefs are rational, i.e.,Å = Å ⇤ 0 4. Consumer beliefs are rational, i.e.,î = î4q
where î4q1 Å5 is the fill rate given initial inventory q and critical signal strength Å.
We emphasize here that although we have explicitly modeled beliefs and imposed rationality on those beliefs, the end result is identical to the Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous move game with full information. This also implies that we implicitly assume consumers are aware of the operating regime of the firm (either single procurement or quick response) as, in general, these two regimes will have different equilibrium fill rates. This assumption is motivated by several considerations. First, our primary focus in this paper is on how the value of quick response is impacted by consumers responding optimally to this practice. This is not to say that it is impossible for firms to mask operational capabilities from consumers, but rather that the regime of interest for this analysis is precisely the scenario in which consumers do correctly infer and optimally respond to the firm's operational capabilities.
Second, although the precise manner in which consumers learn about firm operational capabilities is outside the scope of this paper, quick response has tangible outcomes for consumers (e.g., the impact on product availability) and one might easily imagine that consumers repeatedly patronizing firms may learn over time that firm A has a greater inventory availability than firm B (i.e., firm A uses quick response whereas firm B does not). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that even if a consumer does not explicitly know that a firm uses quick response per se, the consumer becomes aware of the consequences of this strategy by observing measures tangible to her (like fill rates).
5
In addition to anecdotal evidence, recent empirical studies suggest that consumers-or at least some fraction of any particular consumer populationare both forward looking and capable of developing rational expectations thereby correctly inferring future firm actions, even if such actions are probabilistic. Israel (2005) , using data from the automotive insurance industry, estimates that about 20% of individuals are forward looking and form rational expectations of future insurance prices. Osadchiy and Bendoly (2010) , in an experimental setting, determine that about 38% of subjects are forward looking, and the extent of strategic behavior increases as more information about future probabilistic events is given to consumers. Soysal (2008) assumes that consumers do form rational expectations of prices and in inventory availability in a fashion apparel setting, and then uses structural estimation to derive a demand model and determine that expectations of future inventory availability plays a significant role in current period sales. Chevalier and Goolsbee (2009) , in an empirical investigation of the college textbook market, find 5 For instance, consumers have come to expect that video game manufacturer Nintendo is incapable of rapid inventory replenishment to meet demand (Richtel 2007) and hence future availability is low. On the other hand, consumers have come to expect that General Motors (GM) will satisfy demand on hit products and hence future availability is high, a belief that GM is now actively trying to change (Stoll 2007) . More formally, see Su and Zhang (2009) and Kalai and Lehrer (1993) for a discussion and analysis of how consumer learning over time in a similar setting can converge to the equilibrium of a single-shot game with rational expectations.
strong support that consumers are capable of forming rational expectations of the probability that a new edition of a textbook is released (which impacts the resale value of the current edition of a text). Although none of these papers empirically demonstrate that consumers form rational expectations in precisely our setting, 6 the results do provide evidence that consumers are both forward looking and capable of forming such expectations in general, be it regarding price (Israel 2005, Osadichy and Bendoly 2010) ; inventory availability during clearance sales (Soysal 2008) ; or other probabilistic firm actions (such as introducing new products, Chevalier and Goolsbee 2009).
Third, a number of papers in the literature employ similar assumptions in which consumers are aware of high-level firm strategy (quick response or no quick response; display all inventory or display one unit at a time; obtain advance demand information or not), although consumers cannot directly observe low-level tactical decisions like precise inventory amounts. In these models, and in ours, the intent is to consider the equilibrium consumer response to an operational practice once consumers have become aware of, and reacted to, that practice.
Equilibrium and the Value of Quick Response
Having defined the equilibrium that we will analyze, we now proceed to calculate the equilibrium and explore the value of quick response in the next section. We must first prove that an equilibrium to the game exists (and that such an equilibrium is unique) in order to discuss its properties; the following lemma accomplishes this for the SP regime.
Lemma 2. When the firm operates in the single procurement regime, an equilibrium 4q sp 1 Å sp 5 exists and is unique. The equilibrium total demand to the firm is
From (3), the equilibrium demand of the firm is decreasing in Å sp . It is apparent, then, that the firm prefers more consumers to purchase early as this increases total demand. This result is sometimes referred to as the advance selling phenomenon (see Xie and Shugan 2001) in which a firm exploits consumer valuation uncertainty by inducing some consumers to purchase the product before learning their value that will ultimately be dissatisfied (have low valuation).
We next move to the game in which the firm operates in the QR regime. Recall that when determining the number of units to produce using quick response, the firm chooses an inventory level that maximizes total profit. As a result, if the firm has quick response capabilities, the optimal action is to procure enough inventory in the quick response order to satisfy all demand, conditional on a fixed belief about consumer behavior (fixedÅ). Because firm expectations about Å are rational, this means the firm procures enough inventory to satisfy all demand it receives, and hence consumers believe that the fill rate at that firm is equal to 1; after learning the true value of demand, the firm cannot credibly commit to satisfying anything less than the total demand it receives. Quick response thus increases the expected surplus of consumers who delay their purchase by increasing the expected fill rate, and so strengthens the incentive for consumers to wait. All else being equal, this will shift demand to later times, which will in turn decrease the amount of advance selling that occurs.
The story does not end with the effect of quick response on consumer behavior; QR also offers value by better matching supply and demand under uncertainty. Thus, it remains to be seen how QR affects the profit of the firm in equilibrium. Before we answer this question, we must first demonstrate that an equilibrium exists and is unique when the firm operates in the QR regime. The following lemma does this, in addition to comparing the equilibrium outcomes (critical signal strength and inventory level) to the single procurement regime. Having demonstrated that equilibria exist and are unique in both regimes, we may now address the value of quick response: the incremental increase in profit because of the adoption of a quick response system. Our first result demonstrates how the value of quick response is affected by strategic customer behavior: In other words, part (i) of Theorem 1 shows that quick response yields less value to the firm when consumers are strategic than when they are nonstrategic. This is because strategic behavior by consumers reduces the total demand to the firm: When customers are strategic (Ñ = 1), all individuals intentionally delay their purchase, and inevitably some of these customers will not buy the product once they learn their valuation. As a result, the value of matching supply and demand is lower (there is less potential demand to match).
How much is the value of quick response reduced by strategic behavior? Can it ever be negative? Part (ii) of Theorem 1 addresses these questions, yielding a surprising result: Quick response may reduce the profit of the firm even if the marginal procurement cost is strictly less than the selling price. This stands in contrast to the existing literature on quick response: With nonstrategic consumers (e.g., Fisher and Raman 1996) or with strategic consumers in the absence of learning (Cachon and Swinney 2009) , quick response always provides nonnegative value if the margin on a unit procured using quick response is weakly positive (i.e., if c 2  p). Theorem 1 shows that this need not be the case when consumers learn about their valuations over time: It is possible for quick response to yield a positive margin on each unit sold while simultaneously yielding lower expected profit to the firm than the single procurement regime.
The key to both theorems lies in the dual effects of quick response: shifting demand and matching supply with demand. These two effects pull the equilibrium profit of the firm in opposite directions. Shifting demand (from early purchases to later purchases) reduces profits by decreasing the amount of advance selling. Matching supply with demand increases profits by eliminating lost sales-all demand is captured, albeit at a higher unit procurement cost-and reducing the chance of overstock. Hence, the firm only values quick response so long as the cost of shifting demand is exceeded by the gain from better matching supply with demand; see Figure 2 . 7 Theorem 1 demonstrates that the value of both effects is higher when consumers are nonstrategic (Ñ = 0) than when they are strategic (Ñ = 1). When consumers are nonstrategic, the demand shifting effect is eliminated. Furthermore, total demand to the firm is higher, so the value of matching supply and demand-for any given c 2 -is higher than when consumers are strategic. Thus, when Ñ = 0, all three curves depicted in Figure 2 are higher, as Figure 3 demonstrates.
Although we have shown that the value of quick response is lower if consumers are strategic and learn about product value over time, this is not to say that quick response is always harmful to the firm in this setting. As Theorem 1 and Figure 2 demonstrate, quick response can increase the profitability of the firm if, all else being equal, c 2 is small enough. Nevertheless, a result of Theorem 1 is that it may be in the best interests of the firm to forgo quick response tactics and the option to procure additional inventory, and further to ensure that consumers are aware of this operating regime. Particularly in light of additional fixed costs that inevitably accompany the adoption of any quick response system (e.g., shipping and fulfillment infrastructure, IT systems, and production capacity or reservation costs), it is clear that the firm is less likely to benefit from a quick response system when customers are strategic and learn about product value over time. This relates, in part, to the rationing risk results in the literature on strategic consumer purchasing. In contrast to the mere reduction of inventory described in this literature, Theorem 1 implies that the firm may be better off with an entirely different operating policy (single procurement versus quick response) when consumers are strategic-by operating without quick response, the firm's inability to react to updated demand information in a timely and responsive way can benefit the firm by generating a credible mismatch between supply and demand and inducing more consumers to purchase prior to learning their value. 
Consumer Returns
The preceding analysis assumed that a consumer who purchased an item early had no recourse if her value for that item turned out to be low-that is, the possibility that a consumer could return a product if she is dissatisfied was excluded. In some industries, this assumption is appropriate. For example, with most types of media (e.g., movies, music, video games, or computer software) returns are forbidden once an item has been opened (often because of fears of piracy), and Amazon.com does not allow returns on large televisions because of the logistical challenges of return shipping. In some cases, however, product returns are a common and important component of firm strategy. Satisfaction guarantees abound in many settings (clothing, electronics, etc.) , with firms encouraging customers to try new products "risk free" and promoting generous return policies.
8 Such policies increase the consumer incentive to purchase early by reducing the consequences of buying a product that is not valued. Returns policies have received attention in the literature: see, for example, Davis et al. (1995) , Su (2009) , Liu and Xiao (2008) , and Shulman et al. (2009) . However, these papers do not consider the impact of consumer returns policies on a firm's incentives to adopt a quick response strategy.
We assume that returns are allowed throughout the selling season, and each return is for a full refund minus a consumer restocking fee, r c 0 (i.e., the net refund is p É r c ). We present our results for general r c to include the case in which the restocking fee is established by the norm of the industry (e.g., no fee may be customary for competitive reasons), and we discuss the firm's choice of optimal restocking fee below. Returns occur immediately after a consumer who purchased early learns her valuation (e.g., uniformly throughout the selling season). We assume that returned products are resalable-that is, the firm may immediately repackage and resell any returns that it receives. Furthermore, we assume that any consumer who wishes to purchase and finds the firm out of stock costlessly waits to see if any returned products become available to purchase during the selling season. Consumers who make a return incur a hassle cost h 0 deriving from, for instance, the travel cost of returning to a store. Returns are also costly to the firm, incurring an internal firm restocking fee of r f 0 on each returned item (due to, for example, repackaging costs or the cost of employee time). We assume that p É h É r c 0, i.e., a dissatisfied consumer benefits from a return. This implies that if É h 4Å5v É p 0, then
, with returns, high signal consumers have greater incentive to purchase early than without returns. We assume also that returns are enough of a hassle (h + r c is large enough) that low signal consumers still do not purchase before learning their valuations. 9 We are interested in how the addition of the described return policy changes the results of §5, specifically the results provided in Theorem 1. By increasing expected surplus from an early purchase, returns encourage more consumers to purchase before learning their values. Although this would seem to benefit the firm, the increase in advance purchasing comes at a price: Consumers who purchase early and are dissatisfied can be costly to the firm, because each returned unit costs the firm the price of the refund minus the charged consumer restocking fee, p É r c , and the internal firm restocking fee, r f . Thus, the value of quick response practices-which, as we have already mentioned, shift demand by lessening the availability risk associated with delaying a purchase-will depend upon the magnitude of these restocking fees, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 2. If consumer returns are allowed:
c , equilibrium firm profit (in either regime) and the incremental value of quick response are greater with strategic customers than with myopic customers, and the incremental value of quick response is always positive.
(ii) Otherwise (if r f < r c ), equilibrium firm profit (in either regime) and the incremental value of quick response are greater with myopic customers than with strategic customers, and the incremental value of quick response may be positive or negative.
The preceding theorem yields several intriguing results. First, the theorem shows that under consumer returns, if r f r c , firm profit in either regime is greater if customers exhibit strategic behavior than if they are nonstrategic. The key to this result lies in the fact that if r f r c , returns (a) are costly to the firm on a marginal basis and (b) ensure that no consumer who does not value the product receives the product, thereby eliminating the value of advance selling effect and guaranteeing that firm demand (net of returns) is always àN regardless of the value of Ñ. Thus, there is no benefit to selling a unit to a consumer who ultimately possesses low value for the product; on the contrary, this is costly to the firm because of the restocking costs. The firm seeks to minimize the number returns, and the number of returns is lower when consumers are strategic (and hence wait to learn about product value before purchasing) than when they are nonstrategic (blindly purchasing before knowing their real valuation, only to return the item later). If, on the other hand, r f < r c , then the firm charges customers more for a return than its own internal costs associated with a return; in this case, the firm profits from each individual return and so, just as in the model without consumer returns, prefers if customers purchase before learning their valuations. Consequently, the firm prefers a nonstrategic customer population that is more apt to purchase early.
Theorem 2 also shows that if r f r c , quick response always increases firm profit. Just as in part (i) of the theorem, the firm benefits from minimizing the number of costly returns; hence, the tendency of quick response to shift demand also increases firm profit. When r f < r c , however, this may or may not be the case; just as in the model without returns, the firm is hurt by demand shifting as it reduces advance selling and profitable returns. Finally, Theorem 2 shows that if r f r c the result of Theorem 1 is reversed: the value of quick response is greater if customers exhibit strategic behavior than if they are nonstrategic. Intuitively, the ability of a quick response system to induce demand shifting (which is profitable if r f r c ) is most effective when consumers are strategic (indeed, when consumers are completely nonstrategic, quick response induces no demand shifting at all). Hence, the value of quick response is greatest under forward-looking customer behavior. Alternatively, when r f < r c , we again have a result similar to Theorem 1: quick response is less valuable when customers are strategic because it generates demand shifting and causes the firm to lose profitable returns.
The results of Theorem 2 are due to the inclination of consumers to hoard inventory: given that returns are possible, a consumer would rather purchase an item early and run the risk of having to return the product, as opposed to delaying the purchase and risking a stockout. Two ways to reduce hoarding are to increase availability (e.g., adopt quick response) and make consumers strategic (increase Ñ from 0 to 1). If r f r c , then hoarding is costly to the firm and so both strategic behavior and quick response help to minimize this negative behavior. This implies that if Figure 2 were plotted for the case of costly returns (r f r c ), the demand shifting portion of the graph would have positive value.
Lastly, consider the scenario if the firm is capable of choosing whether to offer returns and may set the consumer restocking fee r c to maximize profit. Given our assumptions, the optimal consumer restocking fee is r ⇤ c = p É h, i.e., the greatest possible restocking fee that will induce consumers to return the product. The firm will clearly not offer returns if r ⇤ c < r f because returns are individually costly and also result in a decrease in total sales. Thus, part (i) of Theorem 2 cannot hold if the firm can choose whether to offer returns, because clearly the firm will not offer returns if they are costly. 10 The firm may offer returns if r ⇤ c > r f , in which case individual returns are profitable and part (ii) of the theorem holds. In either case, if the firm can choose whether and how much to charge for returns, the model with consumer returns mirrors our base model, supporting all of our original results.
The fact that in some cases strategic customer behavior can be good for the firm (and for the value of quick response) runs contrary to the vast majority of the strategic consumer literature. This is because, in our model, forward-looking behavior results in actions that benefit customers (due to the avoidance of hassle costs and consumer return fees) and the firm (due to the avoidance of internal firm restocking costs). Thus, our model demonstrates how the interaction of two effects-consumer learning and costly product returns-can lead the firm to benefit from both quick response practices and a very strategic customer population.
Pricing
In this section, we endogenize pricing in our original model and address how the value of quick response is affected. We consider two types of pricing: fixed pricing (in which the retailer sets a single price for the entire selling season) and introductory pricing (in which the retailer may set a different price during the initial-or introductory-release of the product, e.g., when consumer valuations are still unknown). Unlike the inventory level, price is directly observed by consumers, and hence the firm acts as a leader in the price game. Thus, the model with fixed pricing entails a first stage in which the firm sets the (constant) selling price, and a second stage which behaves identically to the games analyzed in § §3-5. As a result, given a particular price, the previous results continue to hold (notably the equilibrium existence results) in the second stage of the game, and we need only analyze the firm's choice of the selling price by comparing expected profits in the inventory/purchasing subgames using various price levels. The following theorem confirms that the result of Theorem 1-quick response may decrease firm profitcontinues to hold even when the firm may set a (constant) price level. In what follows, we use the subscript "fp" to denote equilibrium values (profits, 10 Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that in practice firms may offer returns policies even if returns are individually costly; in many industries (e.g., retailing) the vast majority of returns are for full (or nearly full) refunds because of competitive pressure, and are subsequently costly to firms-see Stock et al. (2006) for a discussion of how firms actively attempt to minimize returns. If this is the case, part (i) of the theorem holds.
quantities, signal strengths) in a model with fixed endogenous pricing.
Theorem 3. The incremental equilibrium value of quick response with fixed pricing is strictly decreasing in the cost of quick response (c 2 ), and if c 2 = v, è qr fp  è sp fp . The key to this result is the following: When prices are fixed across time, regardless of the optimal price level, adopting quick response increases the consumer incentive to wait and hence decreases advance selling and firm profit. The freedom to set the price is of little value in the quick response regime when c 2 is large, because the firm's optimal price lies in the interval 6c 2 1 v7; if the price is lower than c 2 , then quick response is never used, hence the firm essentially moves to the single procurement regime. In the single procurement regime, the firm remains free to price anywhere in the interval 6c 1 1 v7. When the cost of quick response is large, the quick response regime has two detrimental effects to the firm: pricing is constrained and more consumers delay purchasing because of higher availability. As a result, the single procurement regime becomes even more attractive than in the exogenous price case. Thus, Theorem 3 mirrors the result of Theorem 1: it is possible for quick response to decrease profit even when the margin is positive (c 2  p  v).
In the introductory pricing case, we assume that the firm charges two different prices: an introductory price and a regular price. The introductory price is valid only at the start of the selling season (e.g., the first week, or for preorders) when consumers make their initial decision on when to purchase, whereas the regular price is valid thereafter. Consumers develop rational expectations of future prices; that is, they correctly anticipate the regular price (or, equivalently, the firm credibly announces the regular price along with the introductory price). We first note that if the firm is free to set different prices but is constrained only to mark prices down over time, Theorem 3 continues to hold.
11 If the firm can raise prices over time, however, a different picture emerges. Let p 1 and p 2 be the introductory price and the regular price, respectively. Note that the optimal regular price is p 2 = v; all consumers know their values when purchasing at the regular price, and possess values equal to v or 0 for the product. Hence, the firm extracts all surplus from consumers purchasing after learning the product's value by charging the valuation of the high type consumers. Consequently, all 11 It is never optimal in the current model to set an introductory price that is higher than the regular price; the lower regular price would only encourage more consumers to delay purchasing and hence decrease the amount of advance selling. Thus, a firm constrained to mark down over time chooses to set a constant price, and the model reduces to the fixed pricing case analyzed above.
consumers have zero surplus from delaying a purchase (both high and low types, regardless of whether they successfully procure a unit), and all consumers with positive expected surplus from an early purchase will choose to buy before learning their valuations. In general, the optimal introductory price satisfies p 1  v, i.e., the firm charges a lower introductory price to induce some advance selling among consumers.
Because all consumers have identically zero surplus from a delayed purchase, if the firm adopts quick response and raises the consumer expectation of product availability (î), the firm does not raise the expected surplus to any consumers from a delayed purchase. Thus, quick response no longer shifts demand; the only effect remaining is matching supply and demand, hence quick response always has positive value. The following theorem summarizes this result.
Theorem 4. The incremental equilibrium value of quick response with introductory pricing is always positive if
The key to Theorem 4 is that increasing prices over time provides consumers with greater incentive to purchase early, shifting demand from later purchases to the earlier purchases. This effect counteracts the tendency of quick response to shift demand in the opposite direction. Thus, introductory pricing and quick response are complimentary in the sense that they enhance one another's value: increasing prices reduces costly demand shifting because of quick response, and quick response eliminates costly supply/demand mismatches (mismatches that are particularly costly under introductory pricing because of the higher regular price).
Because of the assumption that consumer values follow a two-point distribution, introductory pricing in the present model completely eliminates strategic waiting in the sense that all consumers receive zero surplus from a delayed purchase and hence consumers purchase early if and only if they have positive expected surplus (e.g., as if they were nonstrategic). Should consumers have more than one positive valuation, in general introductory pricing will not eliminate all strategic waiting. In that case, the adoption of quick response once again shifts demand to later times and decreases advance selling; nevertheless, increasing prices over time continues to reduce the amount of strategic waiting that occurs and hence minimizes the negative aspects of demand shifting because of quick response. Thus, although strategic waiting will not in general be eliminated by adopting introductory pricing if consumers have a more complicated valuation distribution, it will be reduced by introductory pricing, a fact that increases the value of quick response relative to the fixed pricing case.
Discussion
Quick response systems-or, more generally, leadtime reduction and rapid inventory replenishmentare often suggested as potential panaceas to the ill effects of supply and demand mismatches. In this paper, we show that such strategies are less valuable to the firm when consumers are forward looking and have uncertain value for a product about which they learn over time. Furthermore, even if the fixed cost of implementing a quick response system is zero, it is possible that the option to receive additional inventory after a forecast update decreases the firm's profit once the consumer response to increased availability is taken into account. In that regard, our base model represents a worst case scenario for the firm. In this scenario, strategic customers that are aware of and respond optimally to the firm's operating strategyquick response-can decrease, and even make negative, the value of this operational strategy. This is because the tangible outcome of quick response to consumers influences purchasing incentives in precisely the wrong way (from the firm's point of view).
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Managerially, these results are important for three reasons. First, a firm may not wish to adopt quick response in this setting, because of the reduction in value caused by the optimal consumer response to the firm's operational capabilities. Second, our model illustrates that in certain cases the firm may wish to mask its operational capabilities from consumers, i.e., to prevent them from reacting optimally. Third, these results show that context mattersspecifically, the characteristics of consumers and of the product-when a firm determines whether to invest in operational flexibility and whether to publicize that investment. It is also worth noting that quick response is an operational proxy for (more generically) information. Taken in that context, our results on the value of quick response are essentially results on the value of accurate information concerning product demand. The fact that quick response sometimes yields negative value supports the maxim that ignorance can be bliss; the lack of accurate information about demand can serve as a commitment mechanism to keep inventory scarce and increase advance selling.
These results provide insight into when a firm should adopt a fast supply chain that allows action on improved demand information. Quick response is most valuable in settings with known or easily determined product value, whereas it is less valuable if the product has difficult to ascertain or uncertain value to consumers. This supports the application of quick response in industries such as fashion apparel (Fisher and Raman 1996, Ferdows et al. 2004 ) over industries with more complicated or innovative products such as electronics (Fisher 1997 , Krishnan et al. 2010 . Quick response can be particularly valuable if paired with introductory pricing ( §7) but may be less valuable if consumer returns are allowed and are costly to the firm ( §6). As we have shown, the value of matching supply and demand depends not only on the reduction of lost sales and excess inventory, but also on the strategic response of the firm's customers to increased product availability. This response can be harmful (if advance selling decreases as a result), beneficial (if costly returns are allowed and hoarding is an issue), and even diminished or eliminated by the appropriate pricing strategy (increasing prices over time in the optimal manner).
Proof of Lemma 1. Consumers who receive a high value signal purchase early if É h 4Å5v É p 0 and if the expected surplus from purchasing early is greater than the expected surplus from delaying, i.e., if É h 4Å5v É p ÑîÉ h 4Å54v É p5. Because Ñî  1, it is true that expected surplus from a delay is increasing in Å at a slower rate than expected surplus from an immediate purchase. Furthermore, if Å = 1, then early surplus is v É p and late surplus is Ñî4v É p5, i.e., early surplus is weakly greater than late surplus. If Å = 1/2, the opposite relationship holds (from our assumption that É l 41/25v É p < 0). Thus, there exists some (unique) critical Å ⇤ such that, for all Å > Å ⇤ , the inequality above is strict, whereas for Å < Å ⇤ , the inequality is violated. É Proof of Lemma 2. Given the firm's beliefÅ concerning the critical signal strength, early demand is composed of two consumer segments: those with high value and correct signals and those with low value and incorrect signals. Let
The total demand from these consumers is thus N é 1 4Å5. All consumers with signal strengths less thanÅ delay purchasing, and only those with high value will purchase the product. Late demand is thus consumers who have high value and received a low value signal, and consumers who have high value, received correct signals, and chose to delay their purchase. Let é 2 4Å5 = à R 1 1/2 41 É x5g4x5 dx + à RÅ 1/2 xg4x5 dx, such that the total demand from these consumer segments is N é 2 4Å5. The total firm demand is thus D = N é4Å5, where é4Å5 = é 1 4Å5 + é 2 4Å5. The firm's expected profit is è4q5 = ⇧6p min4q1 D5 É c 1 q7, which is a concave function of q yielding an optimal inventory level satisfying Pr4D < q5 = 4p Éc 1 5/p. Substituting for D, we see that the best reply function is q4Å5 = é4Å5F É1 44p É c 1 5/p5. We may now derive the equilibrium by imposing the rational expectations hypothesis, which impliesÅ = Å sp andî = î4q
With a random allocation rule, the actual second fill rate for any 4q1 Å5 is given by î4q1 Å5 = ⇧6min44q É é4Å5N 5 + 1 é4Å5N 5/é4Å5N 7. Substituting the firm's optimal inventory level, we see that in any equilibrium,
which is independent of Å. Next, note that the left-hand side of (2) is increasing in Å with a slope of one, and the righthand side is increasing independent of Å in any equilibrium because î4q1 Å5 is independent of Å in equilibrium. Hence, there clearly exists a unique Å that satisfies (2), and thus the equilibrium to the game is unique. É Proof of Lemma 3. Because the firm operates in the QR regime, the only rational belief of the consumer population is thatî = 1; because the quick response procurement is subgame perfect, the firm will satisfy all demand. Hence, the consumer best reply is independent of any firm actions, and is dictated by the solution to (2) withî = 1, which implies Å qr = 41 É à5p/441 É à5p + à4v É p541 É Ñ55. It follows that Å sp  Å qr for any equilibrium fill rate in the single procurement regime. The firm's profit function is è4q5 = ⇧6pD É c 1 q É c 2 4D É q5 + 7, where D = N 4é 1 + é 2 5 and é 1 and é 2 as are in the proof of Lemma 1. It follows that the firm's best reply exists and is unique, given by q4Å Thus, the equilibrium profit of the firm is decreasing in c 2 .
In the limit as c 2 ! p, the margin on each unit sold that is procured via QR goes to zero. The firm's profit effectively becomes the same as if it did not have QR capabilities, except in equilibrium, more consumers will delay purchasing than if the firm did not have QR. Thus, lim c 2 !p è qr = è sp ó Å=Å qr  è sp ó Å=Å sp . É Proof of Theorem 2. We use the subscript r to denote equilibrium values with returns. The proofs of equilibrium existence and uniqueness are similar to Lemmas 2 and 3, and are omitted. With consumer returns, any consumers who purchase early and are dissatisfied with the product will return the item. Because we assume that these products are resalable, the total demand to the firm is simply àN . Thus, the expected profit (without quick response) is è sp r 4q5 = ⇧6pàN É p4àN É q5 + É c 1 q É 4r f É r c 541 É à5N · R 1 Å sp r 41 É x5g4x5 dx7, where Å sp r refers to the equilibrium critical consumer signal strength with returns, determined by equating early purchase and late purchase surplus, yielding qr r É Á sp r . É Proof of Theorem 3. The subscript fp denotes equilibrium values with fixed endogenous pricing. The existence of an equilibrium is immediate, because we have already shown an equilibrium exists to the inventory/purchasing subgames and the firm's expected payoffs are bounded (by 0 and ⇧N 4v É c 1 5) and its strategy space is a compact interval 6c 1 1 v7 in the pricing game (6c 2 1 v7 when using quick response; if the price is less than c 2 but greater than c 1 , the firm will never use QR and reverts to the SP regime). Let Observe that either°è qr fp /°p = 0 (the firm prices at an interior optimum) or dp qr fp /dc 2 = 0 (the firm prices on the boundary, i.e., c 2 or v). Unlike the case without pricing, dÅ qr fp /dc 2 in general does not equal 0. This is because dp qr fp /dc 2 0 and dÅ qr fp /dp 0-in other words, higher costs of quick response lead to higher prices (a natural result) and higher prices lead to more consumers waiting, see Equation (2). Because qr fp /°Å  0 (the more consumers that wait, the lower the firm's profits), it follows that the 4°è we find that profit is decreasing in c 2 , precisely as in the case without pricing, and è qr fp É è sp fp is similarly decreasing in c 2 . In the limit as c 2 ! v, the firm's optimal price with QR goes to v, and margin on each unit sold that is procured via QR goes to zero. Hence, the firm's profit effectively becomes the same as if it did not have QR capabilities, with two caveats: it is constrained to price at v (in the SP regime, the firm can price anywhere in the interval 6c 1 1 v7), and in equilibrium, more consumers will wait than if the firm did not have QR because QR naturally shifts demand. In other words, if c 2 = v, è qr fp É è sp fp = è qr ó p=v É max p26c 1 1v7 è sp  è qr ó p=v É è sp ó p=v  0, where the last inequality follows from Theorem 1. É Proof of Theorem 4. The proof is omitted; because consumers have zero surplus from a delayed purchase they are essentially myopic. É
